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Abstract
We consider a world in which the mode of food production, foraging or agriculture, is endogenous,
and in which technology grows exogenously. Using a recent model of coalition formation, we allow
individuals to rationally form cooperative communities (bands) of foragers or farmers. At the lowest levels
of technology, equilibrium entails the grand coalition of foragers, a cooperative structure which avoids
over{exploitation of the environment. But at a critical state of technology, the cooperative structure
breaks down through an individually rational splintering of the band. At this stage, there can be
an increase in work and through the over{exploitation of the environment, a food crisis. In the end,
technological growth leads to a one{way transition from foraging to agriculture.
\People did not invent agriculture and shout for joy. They drifted or were forced into it, protesting all the
way." Tudge (1998, p.3)
1 Introduction
It is usual for archeologists to break prehistory into lithic (\stone") ages (see Foley (1987, chapter 2)). For
Europe and the Middle East three ages are traditionally recognized: the Paleolithic, a period which began
with the rst evidence of stone tools about two million years ago; then the Mesolithic which began about
13,000 years ago and lasted for about 6,000 years; and nally the Neolithic which ended with the bronze
age. The distinction between the Paleolithic and the Neolithic is the mode of food production, in particular,
hunting and gathering (foraging) in the former and cultivation and animal husbandry (early agriculture) in
the latter. The Mesolithic was a transitional and rather unstable period of broad spectrum foraging and the
earliest agriculture. The long Paleolithic period is further subdivided into periods according to the type of
stone tool use.1 The potential utility of an economic approach to anthropological issues becomes obvious
when one considers that the distinction between the stone ages is economic structure and the chronological
partitioning of the Paleolithic is by the state of technology.
For more than 99% of the last two million years foraging was the principal mode of food production.
However, agriculture emerged independently in a number of dispersed locations in the world within a few
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example it includes the Neanderthal and earlier periods include hominids of smaller cranial capacity. Foley (1987, page 42)
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1thousand years during the early Mesolithic. Our concern in this paper will be to provide some new theory
about the transition from foraging to agriculture. Our explanation will be driven by technological growth.
A central problem in the foraging life-style was the common access environmental problem. We will show
the technological growth may have eventually damaged the ability of foragers to form conserving institutions
(bands) in avoiding over{exploitation. We then show how agriculture and private property could come to
dominate even though it initially provides a lower quality of life.
2 Theories of the Transition
The stylized \facts" reported here come from archeology, modern foragers and other primates.2
The 19th century theory for the transition which dominated up to the 1950s was that life as forager was
short, nasty, and brutish. Paleolithic humans could not produce a surplus above subsistence and therefore
spent all their time trying to get enough to eat in chronic hunger and sickness. The moment some genius
thought of planting seeds the switch was made.
This theory has been rejected by anthropologists (see Megarry (1995, p.225)). Serious inconsistencies
came to light with studies of the fossil record and of modern foraging bands. These showed that the quality
of life under foraging may well have been quite high, what Sahlins (1968) described as the original auent
society. The \cavemen" were skilled artisans who often lived in artifactual shelters rather than caves.
Archeology shows that they lived in semi{nomadic groups or bands of 10{100 individuals. By the upper
Paleolithic, they had a highly developed stone technology (spear throwers, bow and arrow, very rened
stone, antler, and bone blades and points) which allowed them to successfully hunt and butcher the largest
animals (mammoths, horses, deer, reindeer, and bison) (Harris (1977, p.10), Smith (1975, p.729{735)). The
idea that Paleolithic foragers worked around the clock has also come in for criticism. Primate studies and
studies of modern forager societies living under even quite harsh conditions have shown that they may well
have worked less than early agriculturalists and maybe less than we do today (Harris (1977, p.12) and
Haviland (1993, p.154)). Cashdan (1989) who studied the !Kung of South Africa's Kalahari desert reports 3
hours per day in foraging time. With repair of equipment and the equivalent of our housework she reports
a 40 hour work week. There is also evidence that these bands knew how to conserve resources to avoid
over exploitation (Harris (1977, p.12) and (1993, p.159)). One of the responsibilities of the leader of a
native community of the Northwest coast of North America was to decide when to open the salmon shing
season (Johnson and Earle (1987, p.167)). Foragers also knew how to store food when conditions permitted.
Another element which is considered almost a dening characteristic of band life is food sharing. Sharing
or gift exchange (reciprocity) is seen by many anthropologists as promoting cooperation (ctive kinship
relationships) among genealogically unrelated individuals (Johnson and Earle (1987, p.6)).3 In economics,
the idea of reciprocity and cooperation was introduced by Akerlof (1983) in his analysis of labour contracts.
2Because our focus is on the transition between hunting and gathering and agriculture stylized facts for hunting and gathering
will be in regard to the Upper Paleolithic which began approximately 35,000 years ago.
3Kinship theory (the selsh gene) explains why an individual may cooperate with his kin. Cultural anthropologists argue
that culture can create the ctive belief that genetically unrelated individuals are kin. An example of the cultural device that
can be used to create these beliefs is the individuals undertaking behaviour that is typical of kin, such as reciprocity.
2More recently, Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) have shown, in an evolutionary model, how gift giving can
lead to trust and cooperation.
Archeological evidence suggests that the forager's physical health was good implying high levels of con-
sumption. Angel (1975) studying skeletal remains from the upper Paleolithic found that these people grew
taller and had less tooth loss than all but the most recent humans (taller than during the Mesolithic and the
early Neolithic). There is also little evidence of wide{spread disease. It is argued that this is associated with
extremely low population densities throughout the Paleolithic (Harris (1977, p.14) and below). Finally, it is
also known that pre{historic foragers lived side by side with farmers (Cashdan (1989, p.44)) which implies
that the foraging life{style in some cases was a choice.
More recent theories for the transition are based on some combination of population pressure, techno-
logical growth and environmental change. The theories dier in causation and emphasis but they all have a
food crisis as an element in the transition from foraging to agriculture.
The extreme population pressure view captured in Malthusian models of uncontrolled population pressure
leading to a subsidence existence and which is related to pre{1950's theory, would be rejected by most modern
anthropologists. First, as pointed out above there is a good deal of evidence that leisure and in fact the
quality of life during the upper Paleolithic was quite high and possibly higher than during the Mesolithic and
Neolithic ages. Second, there is agreement among anthropologists that Paleolithic peoples controlled their
populations (see Birdsell (1968), Harris (1977, chapter 2), Cohen (1980), Hassan (1980), Lee (1980), Ripley
(1980), Harris (1993, chapter 13), and Megarry (1995, p.221). Population control during the Paleolithic is
reﬂected in it being a period of extremely low population growth. Cohen (1980) estimates annual population
growth of .001{.003% during the Paleolithic with a hundred fold increase during the Neolithic and a 1000
fold increase in modern times. He reports a total population of 100,000 for the Middle East at the end of the
two million year Paleolithic and Harris (1977, p.13) reports a high{end estimate for the population of France
at this point of 20,000. The Paleolithic was also the period of the rst migrations out of Africa. Thus the
extremely low population growth may not have involved any increase in population densities of populated
areas, just greater dispersion.
Methods of population control which were available to Paleolithic people included culturally{demanded
abstinence, disruption of the menstrual cycle through extended years of breast{feeding, abortion, direct and
indirect infanticide (particularly female infanticide), and even dietary cannibalism.4 Among modern foragers
levels of infanticide have been estimated to be as high as 50% (Birdsell (1968, p.243)). Hassan (1980) suggests
percentages in the area of 25{35%.
Clearly besides the issue of feasibility of population control there is also the issue of individual incentive.
It has been argued that woman in foraging societies had strong incentives to have few dependent children
because of the problem, if not impossibility, of carrying all possessions, gathered food and more than one
child over the great distances traveled in a foraging life-style (Lee (1980)).5 Men often did not help with
4The emphasis on female infanticide arises from the number of females being the important population growth variable in
societies without monogamous relationships. See Harris (1993, chapter 13) for a discussion of indirect infanticide in modern
societies.
5This explanation is also consistent with the dramatic increases in population during the Neolithic due to the associated
3carrying, the argument being that they needed to be free to hunt (more likely just free). The psychological
stress of infanticide may have been eased by culturally dening the start of human life long after birth in
much the same way we ease the stress of abortion by dening the start of human life long after conception.
Further, given the band organization the infanticide decision simply may not have been a private one. There
are also arguments that infanticide may have been adaptive evolutionary behaviour (Ripley (1980)). Dietary
cannibalism has also become a subject of discussion in anthropology over the last two decades. It kills two
birds (population pressure and hunger) with one stone (cannibalism). It is known that the practice of large
scale human sacrice in Aztec society (numbers in the tens of thousands) involved cannibalism. Harner (1977)
argues that the ceremonies were actually large{scale dietary cannibalism disguised as a religious ceremony.6
Simpson (1984) points out that among Victorian seafarers cannibalism was considered acceptable as a last
ditch survival method as long as the victim was chosen by lot. In a 1884 case the English legal establishment
expressed its growing disquiet over this practice by charging two sailors with murder. The sailors while adrift
in a life boat for 22 days had eaten the cabin boy. The two were found guilty but then immediately released.
This may suggest that taking a Malthusian{type approach to modeling anthropological issues is assuming
that the \cavemen" were more Victorian than the Victorians.7
Some anthropologists emphasize exogenous environmental shocks. The end of the Paleolithic corresponds
to the end of the last ice age. The ice retreated and there was a global warming. The warming led to a
forestation of former vast grasslands which had covered much of southern Eurasia and which had supported
the Pleistocene megafauna (e.g. mammoth). Through some combination of hunting and environmental
change these animals became extinct during this period. But this explanation has been unconvincing on
its own because similar climatic events had occurred approximately twenty times during the Paleolithic (see
Foley (1989, p.37)) without sparking agriculture.
Finally, there has been a trend in anthropology to turn away from the abstract/universal/explanatory
models of which we are familiar in economics to a more descriptive local model (e.g. McCorriston and Hole
(1991)). But one problem with a local model in this application is that the transition to agriculture happened
independently in various dispersed locations (e.g. both the eastern and western hemispheres) with dierent
local conditions at about the same point in prehistory. In other words there is a universal element to the
transition, which we wish to explore.
3 The Transition as a Breakdown of Community
Because of the good evidence that foragers had the means and the incentive to control population we will
diverge from existing economic work on anthropological issues (e.g. Brander and Taylor (1998)) and assume
that the population is xed. We will also not rely on exogenous environmental shocks. At the heart of
sedentary life-style.
6See also Megarry (1995, p.103 and p.233) for references to recent ndings of cannibalism of the young by chimps. The
chimp is our closest primate relative.
7Harris (1977, 1993) emphasizes a population pressure approach but it is an emotional or psychological population pressure
associated with neglecting or killing children (i.e. an utility based explanation). What this theory lacks as a theory of transition;
is why this suddenly become a serious problem? An anthropological work which does support a strict population pressure theory
was Johnson and Earle (1987). But they did not discuss the infanticide argument.
4our approach will be exogenous technological growth. The growth could be due to Foley's (1987) human
evolution towards improved physical or cognitive abilities or simply due to learning by doing. Clearly one
thing that did distinguish foragers across time was the state of the stone technology. As noted above it was
used to partition the Paleolithic.
When an economist considers the Paleolithic the common property characteristic of the economic struc-
ture is obvious. We will follow earlier economists and use a standard model of renewable resource for the
foraging economy (section 6.2). But we will diverge from existing work, such as Smith (1975), and assume
that foragers had the ability to organize themselves into cooperative communities (bands). The purpose
of the band is to conserve and thus avoid over{exploitation of the environment. We rst dene a band
(coalition) as a non{empty subset of the individuals and a band structure (coalition structure) as a partition
of the set of individuals into coalitions. We assume that to join a band is a individual's agreement to put
its production decisions under the control of the band and to share the resources of the band equally. We
assume that the decision to join the band and cooperate or to not join the band and compete is voluntary
and rational (section 5).8 We also provide a simple model of agriculture with the primary dierence between
modes of food production being the private nature of property under agriculture (section 6.1). Thus a band
is associated with both a set of individuals and a mode of food production. In our model individual par-
ticipation decisions lead to an equilibrium band structure. Because mixed structures of both foraging and
agricultural bands are feasible in our model, we must specify the interaction (externalities) between such
groups. We assume that large bands of foragers impose a security cost on smaller bands of farmers (and
foragers)9 and that farmers through their employment of land in farming reduce the carrying capacity of the
environment available to foragers.
In section 7 we provide results. At the lowest levels of technology the unique equilibrium band structure
is the grand band of foragers|cooperation of the whole. As technology grows, leisure, consumption, and
thereby utility increase. We also show that as technology grows so does the importance of cooperation to
the society. But at a critical level of technology the cooperation structure breaks down through a splintering
of the foraging band. The logic of this result is simple. The conservation undertaken by the grand band is
like the provision of a public good. And we show that the incentive of a small band to break away and hunt
at an individually rational level, while free riding on the conservation undertaken by the others, increases
with the state of technology. In the end, the technological growth in our model leads to a natural one{way
transition from foraging to agriculture. We show that what can be achieved with technological growth in
a renewable resource model of foraging is bounded while what can be achieved from technological growth
under agriculture is not. With the transition, private property comes to replace the cooperative band as the
institution for avoiding the common access problem.
The transition is illustrated in an example in section 8. There, we show that at the critical state
8In modeling band formation we rely on models of non{cooperative coalition formation. See Ray and Vohra (1997) for an
excellent discussion of the literature. The particular model of coalition formation we employ is Burbidge et al. (1997).
9That warfare was in the past a common practice is discussed in Harris (1977, chapters 4 and 5). Chagnon (1968) has
documented the state of perpetual warfare of the Yanoman¨ os, a group of modern foragers living in the forests along the border
between Brazil and Venezuela.
5of technology at which the transition takes place, there is a catastrophic increase in work, decrease in
consumption and through the over{exploitation of the environment, a food crisis.10 We also show that the
transitional period can involve mixed coalition structures of both foraging bands and agricultural bands and
in some cases it involves no equilibrium structure, which we interpret as transitory instability.
In summary and at the risk of over{interpreting a rather simple model, our results are broadly consistent
with the stylized facts discussed in the previous section. First, there is a one way transition from the
Paleolithic to the Neolithic through the Mesolithic|a transitional period characterized by mixed economic
structures and instability. The transition being driven by the well{documented technological growth with a
severe drop in the well{being of individuals at the transition due to a food crisis and over{exploitation of
the environment.
4 An Overview of Band Formation
Throughout there will be two goods; food and leisure. We dene Ci as consumption of food and Zi the
consumption of leisure by individual i. The individual has an endowment of time T which is divided
between Zi; labour Li and enforcement or security eort Mi; so that the individual time constraint is T =
Li+ Zi+ Mi: We will assume that the preferences for an individual are represented by a perfect substitutes
utility function or
U(Ci;Z i)=Ci + Zi = Ci + T − Li − Mi (1)
The simplicity of this form will allow us to solve for all endogenous variables at equilibrium in closed form
and to still bring out the primary qualitative conclusions.11
We begin with a set of identical individuals or N = f1;::;i;::;ng: We assume that individuals are a
member of one and only one band and that bands are homogenous in their mode of production, thus
an individual must be either a forager or a farmer.12 A coalition of individuals (band) employing food
production mode f = A;H is dened as a nonempty subset of N denoted S
f
j ,w i t hA and H denoting
agriculture and hunting-gathering, respectively. A coalition structure is dened as a partition of N and is
denoted B and the set of all possible coalition structures is denoted B: We denote the set of farming bands
in B as BA = fSA
1 ;::SA
j ;::;SA




B = BA [ BH:
We assume that to join a band is an individual's agreement to put its labour supply decision under
the control of the band leader and to share the food resources of the band according to the band's sharing
rule. The labour supplied for food production and security and food consumed in aggregate by a coalition
S
f
j in B is denoted by LS
f
j (B)a n dCS
f
j (B) respectively. The dependence of these on B; not just S
f
j ;
10What we mean by catastrophic is a discrete jump in the value of an endogenous variables due to a marginal change in an
exogenous variable. In our model the food crisis does not lead to extinctions, but with very minor modications of the open
access model in section 6.2 the result could be extinction.
11A numerical example for Cobb{Douglas preferences is available upon request (see also footnote 28).
12An important element of a hunting and gathering life-style was mobility and an important element of agriculture is immo-
bility.
6allows for externalities across coalitions in a coalitional structure. For example, the labour supplied by one
foraging band may aect what is feasible for another band. The labour supplied and the consumption of
an individual i 2 S
f
j 2 B is denoted L
f
i (B)a n dC
f
i (B): We have assumed that individuals are economically
indistinguishable in terms of endowments and preferences so we will assume that the band sharing rule is
to divide work and food equally amongst members or L
f































 is the cardinality of the set S
f
j .13
There are two stages in the overall(transition) game: the band{formationstage; and the band{competition
stage. In the second stage bands are already in place. We assume that the decisions of a band are
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f
j (B). The underlying economies involve strategic interaction so we will assume
that the play across bands is non{cooperative. Thus at the second stage, members of each band co-
operatively play a game in strategic form against other bands to maximize US
f





(B) for the second stage; which is then allocated to i 2 S
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Looking ahead to that stage from the rst stage, each individual will have a set of preferences (payos)
over all possible coalition structures, U
f
i (B) for all B 2 B. Based on these preferences self{interested
individuals in the band formation stage form coalitions which lead to a coalition structure and thus a payo
for each player i; U
i (B)
We now proceed with the formal description of our two stages starting with the rst.
5 The Band Formation Stage
We start with the set of individuals N and model how these players acting in their own self interest, might
choose to align themselves into bands. The approach we will follow is a modication of the approach which
can be found in Burbidge et al. (1997, section V).
With cognizance of the band competition stage the players know U
f
i (B) for all B 2 B; that is, they
would have a preference ordering over all possible coalition structures, B. We use these preference orderings
to construct a game in strategic form for this stage.
We view the group of individuals engaging in non{binding pre{play communication during which possible
options for coalition formation are weighed and potential partners sought. Eventually, each player comes to
formulate a plan for joining a set of partners. A strategy of player i will be identied with a partnership plan
for player i: it is a choice of a mode of production and a coalition to which i wants to belong.15 Formally, a
strategy for player i is a mode of production fi = A;H and a subset of N or S
fi
i with i 2 S
fi
i . A combination
13As noted in the introduction food sharing is often considered a dening characteristic of hunting and gathering bands.
Further as we will explain below it will turn out that our primary results are independent of a specic sharing rule.
14The superscript f in U
f
i (B) is actually redundant, because once i and B are identied, S
f
j 3 i is identied and thus the
mode of production employed by i is identied. But we will include the superscript to improve clarity.
15The modication of Burbidge et al. (1997) is that a partnership plan for i was simply a coalition to which i wanted to
belong. There was no choice over modes of production.





n ); will be referred
to as a prole of partnership plans or a strategy prole. The set of all partnership plans for player i will be
denoted by Si; S = i2N Si will stand for the set of all proles or partnership plans.
How any given prole of partnership plans s 2 S gets reconciled into a resultant coalition structure is
summarized by a function,   : S ! B that assigns to any s 2 S a unique coalition structure B =  (s):
We call the function   the coalition structure rule. Informally, the rule   is meant to capture the players'
expectations, assumed to be commonly held and correct. The question, then, is: what is a sensible modeling
choice for the function   in the context of our band formation game? In Burbidge et al. (1997) a rather
wide class of rules and two specic rules within that class are discussed. But in this paper we will focus on
one rule labeled the similarity rule by Burbidge et al. (1997).16 It is the rule which seems best suited to an
application of band formation as we will explain below.
First, given any i 2 N and s 2 S; let  i(s) denote the coalition to which i belongs in the coalition
structure  (s) resulting from the prole s:
Call the coalition structure rule b   : S ! B the similarity rule if for any strategy prole s 2 S,a n da n y
i 2 N,w eh a v e :





Thus under the similarity rule every set of players with the same partnership plan are in a coalition. In
eect we are interpreting a player's partnership plan as a mode of production and the largest set of partners
it is willing to be associated with in a coalition.17
We now have a well{dened game in strategic form. The coalitional players are the set N of individuals;
the set of strategies available to each player i 2 N consists of all possible partnership plans, Si; every strategy




m00g through the similarity rule, and thus
ap a y o f o re a c hp l a y e ri 2 N of U
f
i (b  (s)). We call the game at this stage the band formation game.
We want to identify a coalition structure B as an \equilibrium" structure if B = b  (s) for an \equilibrium"
strategy prole s for the band formation game. The question now is: what would be an appropriate
equilibrium concept for the model?
The solution concept most commonly invoked for games in strategic form is surely the Nash equilibrium
(NE). Recall that a strategy prole is a NE if no player has a unilaterally protable deviation. For our





n )w i t hS
fi
i =
figfi, i =1 ;2;:::;n, is immediately a NE of the coalition formation game: No individual i, taking as given
the strategy choices of the other n − 1 individuals, can aect the resultant coalition structure b  (s)=
ff1gf1;f2gf2;:::;fngfng and hence its payo. Therefore, the singleton coalition structure is a NE structure
irrespective of the payo functions in the game.18
Clearly, for a model of coalition formation such as this one, one should allow a group of players to
16The rule corresponds to the  model in Hart and Kurz (1983).
17There will be a unique s which leads to the formation of the grand coalition engaged in a mode of production|the s given
by S
fi
i = Nfi and fh = fi for all h;i 2 N; which we denote sfN. To assume otherwise would be to assume that a grand
coalition could form without unanimous consent.
18This is not just a property of the similarity rule, it is a property of a very wide class of rules (see Burbidge et al. (1997)).
8coordinate on a joint deviation if such a deviation were to make each deviating player better o. We are
thus led to a subset of NE which ensure that equilibrium proles are immune to unilateral as well as joint
deviations. An attractive renement in this class is the concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPE),
due to Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). Roughly, a strategy prole is coalition proof if no set of
players, taking the strategies of its complement as xed, can fashion a protable deviation for each of its
members that is itself immune to further deviations by subsets of the deviating coalition. We refer the reader
to the original article for a formal denition. Because the set of CPE is a subset of the set of NE, it should
be noted that any CPE is a NE.
We view the similarity rule as a good candidate for the choice of a coalition structure rule. An important
focus in the results below is on the formation and stability of the grand band of foragers. An important
characteristic of the similarity rule is that if there is a deviation by a set of players Sj from sHN; the
complement of Sj will remain intact in the new coalition structure. Deviators are excluded from the grand
band. We felt that this characteristic of the similarity rule was important in the context of band formation
as it roughly corresponds to the shunning of the deviators.
Finally, we call a coalition structure B aC P Eequilibrium coalition structure or equilibrium outcome if
B = b  (s) for a CPE strategy prole s for the band formation game.
6 The Band Competition Stage
At this second stage the coalition or band structure is already given. Given B; we will now layout the
underlying economies for agriculture and foraging. and their interrelationships. We are working towards
U
f
i (B) for all B 2 B: We begin with the simpler agricultural model.
6.1 Agricultural Model
We assume that the farming activities of one farmer has no impact on the payo of other farmers, whether
those other farmers are members of the same band or not. This implies that there is no gain to farmers
cooperating in their production decisions through forming a band. Thus we assume that a farmer makes his
own production decisions. The sole purpose of joining a band for a farmer is sharing security costs.19 We will
allow for the possibility that farmers face a security cost associated with the existence of individuals outside
of their community who pose a security threat. We assume the security cost of the agricultural band SA
j is
in terms of time and is denoted as MSA
j (B): We will assume that all members of a farming band equally
share the security cost of the band.
Agricultural output is produced according to technology f(li;E i), with positive but decreasing marginal
products, and where  is an agricultural technological parameter, li is the time spent by individual i in the
19Agriculture generates many possibilities for rational cooperation through the formation of a community other than security.
For example, large community projects like the provision of irrigation infrastructure or a grain grinding facilities. In fact, some
have argued that these projects provided the genesis of the pristine state. But our focus here is on the transition from hunting
and gathering to the earliest agriculture. Thus we will focus on providing a more complete model for foraging and use a bare
bones model for agricultural. The fundamental contrast between foraging and agriculture which we will emphasize is the private
property nature of production in the latter.
9elds, and Ei is the amount of land farmed. Agricultural land is freely available but has to be improved
at a labour cost which we assume to be an increasing and weakly convex function of the amount of land
employed, m(Ei), with m0(Ei) > 0a n dm00(Ei)  0. So the individual's labour supply in producing food is
Li = li + m(Ei): Thus individual i 2 SA
j 2 BA; solves the following problem:
max
li;Ei
Ci + Zi subject to Ci = f(li;E i)a n dZi + li + m(Ei)+MSA
j (B)=jS
A
j j = T
Solving this problem yields a labour supply and a demand for land given by li()a n dEi(), respectively.20
These then can be used to yield a solution for utility as a function of  and through the security cost, a
function of B;21
UA
i (B)=f(li();E i()) + T − li() − m(Ei()) − MSA
j (B)=jSA
j j (2)
The simplicity of the agricultural model yields a great deal of tractability which will be useful in the
more complicated foraging model. In modeling foraging we will assume the use of land in agriculture has
an adverse eect on the carrying capacity of the environment. Specically the carrying capacity of the
environment available for foraging is reduced by the use of land in agriculture.22 Let  K be the carrying
capacity in the absence of agriculture. Then we assume the available carrying capacity, K(B), is given
by K(B)=  K − F(B), where F(B) is the total amount of land employed in agriculture and   0i sa
parameter that measures the severity of the externality. In our model each farmer employs Ei() which is








h j is the total number of
farmers in the coalition structure B. This yields






6.2 The Foraging Model





where γ is the intrinsic growth rate and k  (K(B) − X(0))=X(0). This gives a natural growth rate of the
stock of
20Note that a leader of band SA
j choosing li and Ei for all i 2 SA
j to maximize the sum of utilities of all i 2 SA
j and given
the equal sharing rule would also yield the same optimal choices. This simply reﬂects the point that there is no gains from the
cooperation for farmers other than through the sharing of security costs.
21Later, we choose functional forms for f()a n dm() and provide closed-form solutions.
22See Tudge (1998) for a discussion of this interaction.
23It should be noted that X through its dependence on K(B) is also a function of the coalition structure B: B u ta tt h i s
second stage B is given. So we do not include it explicitly. We explicitly write K as a function of B because K will appear in
the closed form for UH










The graph of g(X) against X is described by g( 0 )=0a n dg(K(B) )=0( g r o w t ho ft h es t o c ki sz e r oa t
X = K(B)|the environment is too crowded) and the maximizer for g(X)a tX = K(B)=2|this point is
called maximum sustainable yield:24
The band SH




the catch per unit of eort being proportional to the stock. Parameter  reﬂects the state of the foraging

















So the growth of the stock with foraging is

X= g(X) − CH(B)
The biometric equilibrium is where these are in balance or

















where Xe is the biometric equilibrium stock as a function of LH(B) (from now, we drop the superscript e):










Notice the externality associated with common access entering through LH(B). This provides the benet of



















j (B))2 = −22K(B)=γ < 0( 6 )
24The archeological record involve the extinction of some animals and more generally a food crisis at the time of transition.
Our model can be easily extended to allow for extinction by using a modied logistic function which gives g(X)=γ[1− X
K ]X
which is logistic for  = 1 but for >1h a sg00(X) > 0 at low enough X: The point of transition in our model will involve a
fall in the stock of animals (i.e. food crisis) and this could involve extinction with >1:
11So the graph of CSH
j (B) is described by CSH
j (B)=0a tLSH
j (B)=0 ;C SH







h (B)=2a n dCSH




(B). The feasible space is strictly
convex.
Given the perfect substitutes assumption and (6) a necessary condition for dCSH
j (B)=dLSH
j (B) > 1a t
LSH
j (B)=0 ; that is a positive labour supply, is K(B) > 1: We will take care to choose K suciently large
to satisfy this assumption throughout.
To maximize total utility the band leader sets dCSH
j (B)=dLSH












where the summary parameter I(B)=[ γ(K(B) − 1)]=[22K(B)]: By K(B)−1 > 0, the intercept I(B) >
0 and the slope of the graph of L
SH
j
(B) with respect to LSH
h (B) is negative so there is a unique Nash
equilibrium. Notice that the best responses are symmetric in bands which then allows us to solve for the







Using the equal sharing rule, the time constraint (1), (4), and (5) we can solve for the all endogenous variables










































































where the last equation was simplied using the denition of I(B): With (2) and (7) we now have a solution
for U
f
i (B) for all B 2 B and thus f = A;H.
25Note that the second order condition is satised and that the same rst order condition is implied by the band leader
choosing LSH
j
(B)o rLi(B) for all i 2 SH
j separately.
126.3 Some Preliminary Results for a Foraging Economy
Before working to determine an equilibrium coalition structure providing a theory of transition we will provide
some preliminary results on the relationship between the well{being in a foraging society, technologicalgrowth




j ; and K(B)=K so we denote SH
j = Sj for simplicity.
























Below we will argue that a reasonable specication for MSj(B) would involve there being non{zero
security costs at least for bands which are non-maximal in the coalition structure (i.e. bands which run
the risk of running into larger bands of competitors carrying lethal weapons). Thus we will argue that a
cost of non{cooperative societies with more than one band is the security cost, but for now we assume that
MSj(B) = 0 for all Sj 2 B and for all B 2 B:
Because the act of joining a band is choosing to cooperate with other individuals we will assume that
forming larger bands implies a more cooperative society, specically, we dene a more cooperative society
to be one with a smaller jBj. The extreme examples are the grand coalition B = fNg with jBj = 1 where
everyone chooses to cooperate and the singleton coalition B = ff1g;f2g;:::;fngg with jBj = jNj where
everyone is non{cooperative.
The rst observation arises from the environmental externalities.
Observation 1: For any given level of technology , cooperation is good for the foraging society.
Using (8), the total utility gap between two coalitions structures B0 and B00 which dier by jB0j−j B00j < 0













00j] > 0( 9 )
When B0 = fNg for example this result reﬂects the fact that only in the grand band will there be ecient
labour supply decisions (all externalities are internalized). That the grand band dominates other coalition
structures, in this sense, would simply be reinforced by introducing non{zero MSj(B); as long as one were to
make the reasonable assumption that security costs would be less in the grand band than for other coalition
structures as there are simply no competitors in that structure.
Because an improvement in technology allows more consumption with no decrease in leisure, one would
expect that technological growth is good for a society.
13Observation 2: For any given degree of cooperation (i.e. given a coalition structure) an increase in tech-
nology is good for the foraging society.
The derivative of TU(B) from (8) with respect to  is positive.
Observation 3: As technology increases cooperation becomes more important for society.
The derivative of TU(B0) − TU(B00) from (9) with respect to  is positive. Thus the importance to a
society of cooperative behaviour grows with technology
But as we shall see below these positive observations about cooperation and technological growth do not
preclude the possibility that technological growth can lead to a potentially catastrophic (in the mathematical
sense) deterioration in the well{being of a society. Technological growth can lead to a splintering of a foraging
community and thus a breakdown of cooperation.
7 Equilibrium Transitions
Our approach to the transition from foraging to agriculture will be based on the exogenous technological
growth over time. Each production mode is characterized by a technological parameter:  for foraging and
 for agriculture. These are modeling choices. For example, it would be possible to assume starting values
such that the initial equilibrium state is agriculture. Because we want our model to be consistent with the
obvious fact that the world started with a pure foraging economy, we begin with an assumption.
A.1: In the earliest of times (low enough >1=K(B)) agriculture is simply not viable.
This could be formalized by assuming that for low enough >1=K(B);= 0 in which case, no
agricultural production will take place.26
But eventually, we think it is natural to assume that improvements in the foraging technology spill over as
improvements in the agricultural technology. Note that there are stages in either production process which
are similar, for example, the butchering of a carcass or the grinding of grains. Thus the development of very
sharp blades for butchering during the upper Paleolithic, clearly was an important positive technological
development for agriculture. Formally, we will assume that there is some >1=K(B) denoted ,w h e r e
agriculture becomes viable (e.g.  becomes positive). From then on, we assume that the relationship ()
is strictly increasing.27 Also note that for <, K(B)=K and I(B)=I; or there is no damage to the
carrying capacity due to farming until farming is viable.
We have structured the model so that agriculture is not a viable alternative initially, but that leaves the
question as to what is the initial equilibrium coalition structure for foraging. In what follows the specication
26This assumption really is one of convenience in the sense that it is not necessarily required for any of our propositions
1{3 below. The proof of this is that in the example which we provide below we simply assume that at time zero  =1 =K(B)
and  =0 ; so that both begin on the verge of viability, and then allow for  and  to grow equally quickly over time (perfect
technological spillovers). We then provide results for the example which are perfectly consistent with propositions 1{3.
27Alternatively, we could have endogenized technological growth by assuming, for example, that mode f technology grows
faster when more individuals use it. But this would have complicated the analysis without changing the ﬂavour of our results.
Indeed, in what follows, foraging is eventually replaced by agriculture precisely because it has become too productive (not
because agriculture has grown at a faster rate), thereby making cooperation in foraging untenable. If our model was to account
for endogenous technological growth, it would be possible to discuss the speed at which the transition takes place, but it would
not change the basic rationale underlying the transition.
14of security costs will be important. For both foraging and agriculture it seems natural to assume that in
a fully cooperative society B = fNfg there are no security costs. Further, we will assume that it is large
bands of foragers that generate security costs, so that coalitions which are maximal, in the sense that in
their coalition structure there is no larger{sized band, also pay no security costs. Thus MS
f
j (B) becomes the
cost of running into a larger group of competitors with lethal weapons.
Proposition 1: For A.1, any , MS
f
j (B)> 0 for any S
f













 for at least one SH
h 2 B,
and for suciently low >1=K, the unique CPE is sHN and thus the unique equilibrium band structure in
the earliest of times is the grand band of foragers B = b  (sHN)=fNHg.
Proof:
a) We rst prove that the individual payo in the grand band Pareto dominates the payos in all other
coalition structures at low levels of technology or UH
i (fNHg) >U H
i (B) for all B 6= fNHg and suciently
low >1=K: For all coalition structures where all bands are of equal size (cardinality) every individual in
the coalition structure has equal utility (see (7)). But the total utility in such a coalition structure is less
than in the grand coalition by (8). Thus the equal share of the smaller pie implies UH
i (fNHg) >U H
i (B)
for B with all bands are of equal size. In coalition structures with bands of unequal sizes the coalitions
which are not maximal pay a security cost MS
f
j (B)> 0; given this and by (7) at  =1 =K utility in the grand
band will be discretely higher in the grand band. Therefore given the continuity of UH
i (B)i n and for
small enough >1=K; UH
i (fNHg) >U H
i (B) for individuals in coalitions which are not maximal in their
coalition structure. Individuals in coalitions which are maximal in their coalition structure pay no security
costs. For such individuals i 2 SH
j 2 B by (7),
UH
i (fNHg) − UH
i (B)=
2I[K − 1]
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  2a n d>1=K:
b) We now prove that because UH
i (fNHg) >U H
i (B) for all B 6= ffNgg for suciently low >1=K that
the unique CPE is sHN and thus the unique equilibrium band structure in the earliest of times is the grand
band of foragers B = b  (sHN)=fNHg: The strategy prole sHN is CPE because there are no protable
deviations. From any s 6= sHN there are protable joint deviations by all players with strategies SH
i 6= NH
and these deviations are credible because there is no protable deviations by any subset of initial deviators.
We next consider the consequences of technology growth in foraging for the equilibrium coalition structure.
Proposition 2: For any ; N > 2, and for suciently high >1=K, sHN is not a CPE and thus the grand
band of foragers, b  (sHN)=fNHg is not an equilibrium outcome. As technology increases beyond a critical
point there would be a breakdown of cooperation due to a splintering of the foraging band structure.
Proof: From (7) and the denition of the summary parameter I and with simplication the dierence
UH








15Thus the dierence is positive at K −1 = 0, has a negative rst derivative with respect to  for K −1 > 0,
and a negative limit as  !1 : Therefore there is one and only one critical level of  for >1=K denoted
 at which the dierence is zero. The dierence is a quadratic in : Denoting Mfig(ffigH;fNnigHg)b yM;
 =








N +3 6 MKN
for 0 < 9γK − 4γKN +3 6 MN
 =








N +3 6 MKN
for 0 > 9γK − 4γKN +3 6 MN
When 9γK − 4γKN +3 6 MN > 0 it is as shown, because the other root is negative for N>2: When
9γK − 4γKN +3 6 MN < 0 it is possible that both roots are positive for N>2 but given the argument
above only one can be such that >1=K and it will necessarily be as shown|the larger root|the other
root is negative or positive but less than 1=K.
Therefore at the critical technology  a marginal increase in  leads to a unilateral protable deviation
by player i from sHN to Si = figH which leads to b  (s)=ffigH;fNnigHg and unilateral deviations are
always credible. Thus sHN is not CPE (it is not even a NE). Therefore the grand band of foragers,i sn o t
an equilibrium outcome and there is a breakdown of cooperation due to a splintering of the foraging band
structure.28
One might wonder to what extent this result is due to the equal sharing rule within bands.
Observation 4: For any ; N > 2, and for >, there is no way to divide the resources of the grand band
of foragers to make it a CPE equilibrium band structure.
Proof: For singleton bands a sharing rule is redundant. The total utility in the grand band of foragers
available for distribution through asymmetric sharing of work and consumption is NUH
i (ffNgHg): But
because NUH
i (ffigH;fNnigHg) >N U H
i (ffNgHg) there is no way to divide the resources of the grand
band to make sHN immune to protable unilateral and therefore credible deviations by each individual and
thus to make sHN a CPE.
The intuition for the splintering is strong. The conservation undertaken by the grand band is like the
provision of a public good. Now imagine a player in the grand band as technology improves. The value of a
unilateral deviation by the individual is that by breaking away it no longer is required to conserve|it can
hunt to an individually rational level and free ride on the conservation done by the others. The costs of
deviation are that the others may not do as much conservation, now that they compete with the deviator and
the cost of being expelled from the band which we model as a security cost. As the technology improves and
labour becomes more productive the cost of the conservation (i.e. the loss in consumption from restricting
28A security cost is not necessary for propositions 1{3 to obtain. Indeed, in a 3-player example in which preferences are
Cobb-Douglas (available upon request), the grand band of foragers may break down in the absence of security costs. The
splintering takes place because the payo of an individual going solo comes to dominate what he obtains within the grand band.
Hence, at the critical technology level, the grand band is replaced as the equilibrium outcome by another structure.
16your labour supply) increases but the security cost remains constant. That is, at some point the value of
free riding comes to dominate even a very severe security cost and cooperation breaks down.29
Corollary: If the breakdown in the cooperative structure happens at a state of technology where agriculture
is not yet viable, for example,  < ; then one of two things happen; either there is instability (in the sense of
there being no CPE equilibrium coalition structure) or there is an equilibrium coalition structure other than
the grand band and the transition involves a catastrophic (discontinuous) increase in work and decrease in
the stock of animals, that is, instability and/or a potential food crisis.
To verify that there must be a discontinuous adjustment in terms of work and the animal stock in moving
away from the grand band at the critical technology, see (7).30
We now consider the potential for a transition to agriculture as technology improves enough that agri-
culture becomes viable.
Lemma 1: As technology grows there is an upper bound on the foraging payo.
Proof: Note that the best case scenario for growth in the foraging payo is when  = 0 and therefore
K(B)=  K, i.e. if the payo is bounded for  = 0, it certainly is for >0. Then for  =0a n dK(B)=  K,
taking the limit of UH


















so the foraging payo is bounded from above.
This is in fact a very natural result in a model of renewable resource use. Food consumption is bounded
by the maximum sustainable yield and thus as technology goes to innity utility goes to the utility associated
with food consumption at the maximum sustainable yield and full{time leisure. It also seems natural at this
point that people would begin to work to improve the carrying capacity but this is, of course, an element of
agriculture.
Lemma 2: There is no bound on the agricultural payo so that improvements in foraging technology which





Proof: The result follows from noting that 0() > 0 and taking the limit of UA
i (B)i n( 2 )w h e n !1 .
Proposition 3: There is eventually an equilibrium transition from the grand band of foragers to some pure
agriculture coalition structure.
29There are alternative ways to model the cost of going it alone. One is a shunning cost, but another alternative is a reduced
potential for risk sharing. Risk sharing is discussed extensively in Johnson and Earle (1987). The foraging economy is obviously
one characterized by a great deal of risk. The grand band provided opportunities for risk sharing which are lost in going it
alone. It may be that technological growth reduces the need for risk sharing.
30In the illustrative example below we show that at  =  there is a discontinuous transition to the singleton band structure.
This involves over exploitation of the environment, a resultant drop in the foraging stock and thus a food crisis, and a drop in
leisure, in consumption, and thus in utility for each individual.
17Proof: From Proposition 1 the initial situation is cooperative foraging. From Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 the
agricultural payo in a pure agricultural coalition structure will come to Pareto dominate the payos in
any other pure or mixed coalition structure. Once there is Pareto dominance of one type of structure over
all others then the proof that such a structure is the equilibrium outcome is as in part 1b of the proof of
Proposition 1. The strategy prole is CPE as no protable unilateral or joint deviation is possible given its
Pareto dominance. Any CPE equilibrium structure must be pure agriculture as from anything else there
is protable unilateral or joint deviations which lead to it and these are credible as there are no further
protable deviations by subsets of the initial deviators.
8 Illustrating the Transition
To illustrate the propositions and further understand the nature of transition we provide an example.






i =2s ot h a tLi = li + E2
i =2: Then solving the program for individual i 2 SA
j 2 BA yields






for all i 2 SA
















































 for all i 2 SA
j 2 BA
and then







We then assume N = f1;2;3g; T =2 4 ; K =1 0 ;γ=1a n dMfigf(ffigf;fh;kgHg)=0 :225 for f = A;H
and MS
f
j (B)=0o t h e r w i s e : The necessary restriction for positive labour supply in foraging is K(B) > 1,
given K = 10 for pure foraging structures we will restrict >0:1 and to larger  in mixed coalition structures
where the externality becomes operative K(B) < K:
Finally there is relationship of  and . We will assume that  = −1=K so that in the earliest of times
both begin on the verge of viability and grow one for one over time (perfect technological spillovers). This
is of course a weaker assumption then A.1 because both are initially equally viable. Because it is weaker we
cannot simply rely on the proofs above, for example, we must prove that an agriculture is not the initial
equilibrium outcome.
18Result 1: For any  and for the lowest levels of technology (0:1 <<1), the unique CPE is sHN and thus
the unique band structure is the grand band of foragers B = b  (sHN)=fNHg.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Because of the added structure of the example we can go further than Proposition 2.
Result 2a: For  =0and for higher levels of technology (1 <<2:103), the unique CPE band structure
is the singleton forager band structure, B = ff1gH;f2gH;f3gHg; that is, at  =1 , there is a breakdown
of cooperation due to a splintering of the foraging band structure and a transition to a new structure where
everyone is worse o. The transition involves over{hunting which leads to a food crisis.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
For this example the  of the previous section is precisely unity which explains why the grand band
breaks down but here you can go further and prove that the unique equilibrium coalition structure is the
singleton coalition structure for  = 0. The result can be extended to   0 in a limited way.
Result 2b: For   0 and for higher levels of technology (1 <<2:103), the grand band of foragers is
not a CPE band structure and the singleton forager band structure, B = ff1gH;f2gH;f3gHg is a CPE band
structure. But for some >0, B = ffhgH;figA;fkgAg or B = ffhgH;fi;kgAg may also be CPE band
structures.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Thus, when farming imposes a negative externality on foraging, there can be multiple equilibria and
multiple equilibrium outcomes. We interpret this result as showing, realistically, that there would be no
unique path from foraging to agriculture during the Mesolithic. Note that the equilibria that can obtain
with the farming externality, and that could not obtain without it, involve mixed coalition structures. The
intuition for multiple equilibria is as follows. When there is no externality, the payo from foraging is
relatively high in mixed structures. Because foraging is attractive, all individuals become foragers and no
one chooses farming, thereby mixed structures are avoided. Alternatively, when there is an externality, the
payo from foraging is relatively low in mixed structures. Because foraging is not so attractive, some farmers
in mixed structures do not have protable deviations to foraging, thereby supporting the mixed equilibrium.
We now illustrate Proposition 3.
Result 3: At a suciently high state of technology, >3:042, there will be a transition to a purely agriculture
structure where all individuals are farmers. For example sAN is CPE and then B = b  (sAN)=ff1;2;3gAg
is an equilibrium coalition structure.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
We now graph the foraging stock (Figure 1) and utility (Figure 2) for  = 0 at full equilibrium B.
| FIGURE 1 AND 2 |
So at  = 1, the cooperation breaks down, the band splinters and their is a catastrophic increase in work,
decrease in consumption, leisure, and utility through over{exploitation of the environment and thus drop
19of the shared foraging stock|a food crisis. Eventually there is a smooth transition to a pure agricultural
structure
We now provide a new result that could not have been obtained in the more general framework of last
section.
Result 4: The transition from the grand band of foragers to a purely agricultural structure can involve
unique mixed coalition structure outcomes with bands of both foragers and farmers. The transition can also
be characterized by instability where we interpret the lack of existence of a CPE equilibrium structure as
instability.
Proof: The example provided in Appendix 2.
9 Conclusion
To explain the transition between important economic institutions, most economists would only be satised
with a model inhabited by self{interested and non{cooperative agents. At the same time, in describing the
Paleolithic, most anthropologists would only be satised with a model incorporating the notions of coopera-
tion and conservation within foraging bands. Therefore, because it allows for the non{cooperative formation
of cooperative bands, our model seems well suited to study the transition from foraging to agriculture.
We intentionally avoided the population growth explanation. As was argued in section 2, it is probably
correct to say that the jump in the population growth rate observed at the start of agriculture was caused
by humans switching to agriculture | not the reverse. We also avoided the exogenous environmental shock
explanation. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the `right' transition{generating shock could have occurred
in all the locations in which the transition took place, within a relatively short period of time. Also,
environmental shocks of all sorts happen frequently. One would therefore need an explanation as to why, for
thousands of years, shocks did not trigger the transition, and why they eventually did. This being said, we
provide a new explanation, but we do not claim that others did not play an important role.
The explanation for the transition oered in this paper is based on technological growth and the incapacity
of bands of foragers to maintain cooperation when foraging has become too productive. That technology
improved steadily throughout human history is hardly controversial; it is a well accepted fact by all social
scientists.
Our story provides an explanation for the endogenous occurrence of the transition and generates a
number of other endogenous phenomena, not all of which could have been obtained with the population or
the environmental shock explanations.
 The band structure evolves in a non-trivial fashion: from large bands to smaller bands to possibly
larger bands.
 Hunting-gathering and agriculture may coexist for some time.
 The over-exploitation of the environment that may precede the transition is not due to the absence of
20an institution to prevent over-exploitation, but rather to the endogenous collapse of such an institution
(the grand band).
 A food-crisis may precede the transition.
 During the transition, individuals may want to remain foragers, but be forced into agriculture. They
may therefore suer a utility drop during the transition.
The study of how we became farmers thousands of years ago is, in itself, interesting. But the mechanism
that we identied in this paper may also prove useful in explaining the recent success or failure of informal
common property resource management systems. Ostrom (1990) provided case studies of a large number of
communities smoothly managing a common property by use of such informal resource management institu-
tions. These institutions have typically evolved to their current structure over a long period of time. Key
to the success of these institutions | as measured by the fact that the resource has not been depleted | is
their design which ensures and fosters cooperation within the community. Examples of resources that have
been successfully managed include sheries, drinking water, irrigation systems, etc. But Ostrom is aware
that these informal institutions are fragile. When discussing the impact of technological progress, she points
out that it can destabilize and even destroy informal institutions: \... the management of complex resource
systems depends on a delicate balance between the technologies in use and the entry and authority rules used
to control access and use. If the adaptation of new technologies is accelerated, the relationship between the
rules and technologies in use may become seriously unbalanced. This is particularly the case when the rules
have come about through long processes of trial and error (...) The rapid introduction of a `more ecient'
technology can trigger (...) the `tragedy of the commons' ..." [Ostrom 1990, p.241, note 29].
Indeed, there are cases where a resource management institution operated well for a period of time and
then collapsed after the introduction of a new technology, triggering a `tragedy of the commons'. One such
failure, documented by Cordell and McKean (1992), concerns the management of a sh stock by small
communities on the coast of Bahia in Brazil. The story they recount is similar to that developed in this
paper. Until 1970, these communities, through a traditional and complex system of sea tenure, were able to
avoid over{exploitation of their stock of sh. But in the early 1970s, nylon nets | an improvement over the
traditional shing technology | were introduced when the Brazilian government started providing loans and
tax incentives for shery development. The system of sea tenure rapidly collapsed and this in turn triggered
a destructive tragedy of the commons. Cordell and McKean report that since then, the stock of sh has
been gravely depleted. Of course, traditional shermen have suered the most from the introduction of the
more eective technology.
The idea that human institutions evolve is not new in economics (North, 1993). Models that allow for the
systematic and rigorous study of the non-cooperative formation of equilibrium institutions or communities
which aim to facilitate cooperation, however, are only now becoming widely available.31 If anthropologists
are right, 99% of our existence and much of our evolution occurred in such communities. If Ostrom (1990) is
31See Ray and Vorha (1997) for a discussion of recent developments.
21right, these institutions are an important and policy relevant component of modern societies. This is further
strengthened by consideration of the global environmental problems we now face. Thus, we hope that the
application of these models to the study of the evolution of human institutions may prove to be fruitful.
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2411 Appendix 1
Proof of Result 1:
Part 1: Consider the case with  =0
Using (7) and (12) and the parameters in the example we derive the following tables which provide
ordinal rankings, Ri(B) for all B 2 B and 0 <<1: The indexes we use for players are h =1 ;2;3a n d
i =1 ;2;3 6= h and k 6= h and k 6= i and the highest ranking is indicated by a 1 etc..
Table A1.1: Ranking of Payos,  =0 , 0:1 <<0:182
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) ffhgH;figH;fkgHg 5 5 5
2) ffh;igH;fkgHg 6 6 8
3) fh;i;kgH 4 4 4
4) ffhgA;figA;fkgAg 7 7 7
5) ffh;igA;fkgAg 7 7 7
6) fh;i;kgA 7 7 7
7) ffhgH;figA;fkgAg 1 7 7
8) ffhgH;fi;kgAg 1 7 7
9) ffhgH;figH;fkgAg 3 3 7
10) ffh;igH;fkgAg 2 2 9
At  ' 0:182;U H
k ffh;igH;fkgHg cuts UA
i from below and thereby the rankings change. The multiple
rankings in the rst two rows simply indicate that over this range of ; these elements can take on these
rankings|rst UH
k ffh;igH;fkgHg cuts UH
h ffh;igH;fkgHgfrom below and then UH
h ffhgH;figH;fkgHg
from below. But the multiple rankings do not alter the proofs used below, so we include them in one table.
Table A1.2: Ranking of Payos,  =0 , 0:182  <1
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) ffhgH;figH;fkgHg 5,6 5,6 5,6
2) ffh;igH;fkgHg 6,7 6,7 5,6,7
3) fh;i;kgH 4 4 4
4) ffhgA;figA;fkgAg 8 8 8
5) ffh;igA;fkgAg 8 8 8
6) fh;i;kgA 8 8 8
7) ffhgH;figA;fkgAg 1 8 8
8) ffhgH;fi;kgAg 1 8 8
9) ffhgH;figH;fkgAg 3 3 8
10) ffh;igH;fkgAg 2 2 9
The problem now is to take these rankings to the coalition formation stage to determine an equilibrium
band structure.
25Part 1a: For 0:1 <<0:182 (Table A1.1)
From the strategy prole sHN (or B = b  (sHN)=ff1;2;3gHg) there are no protable deviations as the
only U
f
i (B) >U H
i ff1;2;3gHg requires an s with at least one coalition deviating from sHN t oas t r a t e g y
with A as its mode of production (rows 7{10), but this is not protable for that coalition. Therefore sHN is
a CPE.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 there are always protable
and credible deviations by the subset of players with S
f
i 6= NH to SH
i = NH: They are protable (see Table
A1.1) and credibility is established by sHN being CPE. From any s which leads to the coalition structures in
rows 7 and 8, there is always a protable and credible deviation by i to SH
i = figH: It is protable for i as
this deviation necessarily leads to row 9 and a unilateral deviation is always credible. From any s which leads
to the coalition structure in row 9, there is always a protable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by
k to SH
k = fkgH as this leads to row 1. From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10, there is
a protable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH as this leads to row 2. Therefore
the unique CPE is sHN and the unique band structure is the grand band of foragers B = b  (sHN)=fNHg.
Part 1b: For 0:182 <<1 (Table A1.2)
From the strategy prole sHN (or B = b  (sHN)=ff1;2;3gHg) there are no protable deviations as the
only U
f
i (B) >U H
i ff1;2;3gHg requires an s with at least one coalition deviating from sHN t oas t r a t e g y
with A as its mode of production (rows 7{10), but this is not protable for that coalition. Therefore sHN is
a CPE.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 there are always protable
and credible deviations by the subset of players with S
f
i 6= NH to SH
i = NH: They are protable (see Table
A1.2) and credibility is established by sHN being CPE. From any s which leads to coalition structures in
rows 7{10 requires at least one player say k with a S
fk
k and fk = A; but then there will always be a unilateral
protable deviation to S
fk
k with fk = H and unilateral deviations are always credible. Therefore the unique
CPE is sHN and the unique band structure is the grand band of foragers B = b  (sHN)=fNHg.
Part 2: Extending to >0
This extension only aects the payos of foragers and only in rows 7{10 where there are farmers. In
particular it lowers the foragers payos and more so in coalition structures with more farmers, that is, rows
7a n d8 . 32 So as  increases from 0 the payos in row 10 for foragers will still dominate those in 9 but those
in 10 will come to dominate 7 and 8 and eventually those in 9 will dominate 7 and 8 and then rows 7{10
will start falling in the rankings against row 3.
Part 2a: Extending to >0f o r0 :1 <<0:182
Notice that these changes in all cases leave the proof that sHN is a CPE, as in part 1a. The proof that
any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is not CPE is also as in part 1a.
From any s which leads to either of the coalition structures in row 7 and 8 if UA
i (ffhgH;figA;fkgAg)=
UA
i (ffhgH;fi;kgAg) <U H
i (ffhgH;figH;fkgAg) then exactly as with  = 0 there is a protable unilat-
eral and therefore credible deviation by i to SH
i = figH: If on the other hand UA
i (ffhgH;figA;fkgAg)=
UA
i (ffhgH;fi;kgAg)  UH
i (ffhgH;figH;fkgAg) and if SH
h = fh;i;kgH then there is a protable joint de-
viation by i and k to SH
i = SH
k = fh;i;kgH which is protable by a farming payo being dominated by
any foraging payo with B = ffh;i;kgHg and is credible by sHN b e i n gaC P E .A n di fSH
h 6= fh;i;kgH
then there is protable joint deviation by i and k to SH
i = figH and SH
k = fkgH which is protable by
any farmer payo being dominated by any foraging payo with B = ffhgH;figH;fkgHg and is credible by
UH
i (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >U H
i (fhgH;fi;kgH); and ffh;i;kgHg not being possible with SH
h 6= fh;i;kgH,a n d
32For foragers mixed with farmers (rows 7{10) and with >0 it may even be the case that the carry capacity is suciently
lowered that foraging is not viable in the sense that K(B) < 1= for >0:1: The payo in these cases would be T net of any
security costs. Even in this case our proofs below go through.
26UH
i (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >U A
i (B)a n dUH
k (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >U A
k (B) for any other B with fhgH for both
i and k:
From any s that leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SH
h 6= SH
i therefore there is a
protable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: Because it leads to row 1 it is
protable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a protable unilateral and therefore
credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: It is protable for k as this deviation necessarily leads to row 2.
Part 2b: Extension to >0f o r0 :182 <<1
Notice that in all cases the proof that sHN is a CPE is as in part 1b.. The proof that any s which leads
to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is not CPE is also as in part 1b.




i (ffhgH;figH;fkgAg) then exactly as before there is a protable unilateral and therefore
credible deviation by i to SH




i (ffhgH;figH;fkgAg) and if SH
h = fh;i;kgH then there is a protable joint deviation by i and k to
SH
i = SH
k = fh;i;kgH which is protable by any farmer payo being dominated any foraging payo with B =
BH and is credible by sHN being a CPE. And if SH
h 6= fh;i;kgH then there is protable joint deviation by i
and k to SH
i = figH and SH
k = fkgH which is protable by any farmer payo being dominated any foraging
payo with B = BH and is credible by UH
i (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >U H
i (fhgH;fi;kgH); and ffh;i;kgHg not
being possible with SH
h 6= fh;i;kgH,a n dUH
i (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >U A
i (B)a n dUH
k (fhgH;figH;fkgH) >
UA
k (B) for any other B with fhgH for both i and k:
From any s that leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SH
h 6= SH
i therefore there is a
protable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: Because it leads to row 1 it is
protable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a protable unilateral and therefore
credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: It is protable for k as this deviation necessarily leads to row 2.
Proof of Result 2a:
From (7) and (12) at >1;U H
k (ffh;igH;fkgHg) >U H
k (ffh;i;kgHg)a n da t>2:103 some agricultural
payos come to dominate some payos in rows 1{3 (see Table A1.3).
Table A1.3: Ranking of Payos,  =0 , 1 <<2:103
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) ffhgH;figH;fkgHg 6 6 6
2) ffh;igH;fkgHg 7 7 4
3) fh;i;kgH 5 5 5
4) ffhgA;figA;fkgAg 8 8 8
5) ffh;igA;fkgAg 8 8 8
6) fh;i;kgA 8 8 8
7) ffhgH;figA;fkgAg 1 8 8
8) ffhgH;fi;kgAg 1 8 8
9) ffhgH;figH;fkgAg 3 3 8
10) ffh;igH;fkgAg 2 2 9
From the strategy prole sHN there is a protable unilateral, and therefore credible deviation, by k to
SH
k = fkgH: From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 2 there is a protable unilateral,
and therefore credible, deviation by i to SH
i = figH: Any s which leads to coalition structures in rows
274{10 requires at least one player, say 1; with SA
1 , but then there will always be a unilateral protable, and
therefore credible deviation to SH
1 = fkgH:
Therefore if there is a CPE band structure it must be the singleton foraging structure. The prole of
partnership plans s =( f1gH;f2gH;f3gH) is immune to any deviation with fi = A as these are not protable.
It is immune to any unilateral deviations with fi = H because it takes a joint deviation to create a multi{
player coalition. It is immune to any joint deviation by two players to SH
h = SH
i (which is required to form
the coalition fh;igH) because such a deviation is not protable. Finally, it is immune to a joint deviation
by all players to sHN (which is required to form the grand band of foragers) because sHN is not CPE of
the subgame of all players. Therefore the singleton coalition structure of foragers is the unique equilibrium
band structure.
Proof of Result 2b:
From the strategy prole sHN there is a protable unilateral, and therefore credible deviation, by k to
SH
k = fkgH: From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 2 there is a protable unilateral, and
therefore credible, deviation by i to SH
i = figH:
The prole of partnership plans s =( f1gH;f2gH;f3gH) is immune to any deviation with fi = A as these
are not protable. It is immune to any unilateral deviations with fi = H because it takes a joint deviation
from s =( f1gH;f2gH;f3gH) to create a multi{player coalition. It is immune to any joint deviation by
two players to SH
h = SH
i (which is required to form the coalition fh;igH) because such a deviation is not
protable. Finally, it is immune to joint deviation by all players to sHN (which is required to form the grand
band of foragers) because sHN is not CPE of the subgame of all players. Therefore the singleton coalition
structure of foragers is a CPE band structure.
From any s which leads to coalition structures in rows 4{6 there is a protable joint deviation to s =
(f1gH;f2gH;f3gH): It is protable as it leads to row 1 and is credible because s =( f1gH;f2gH;f3gH)i s
CPE of the subgame of all players.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SH
h 6= SH
i therefore there is
a protable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: Because it leads to row 1 it is
protable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a protable unilateral and therefore
credible deviation by k to SH
k = fkgH: It is protable for k as this deviation necessarily leads to row 2.
This leaves rows 7 and 8. Consider the b s consisting of SH
h = fh;i;kgH and SA
i = figA; and SH
k = fkgA
and the following table
Table A1.4: Possible Ranking of Payos, >0,  2]1;2:103[
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) ffhgH;figH;fkgHg 4 4 4
2) ffh;igH;fkgHg 5 5 2
3) fh;i;kgH 3 3 3
4) ffhgA;figA;fkgAg 6 6 6
5) ffh;igA;fkgAg 6 6 6
6) fh;i;kgA 6 6 6
7) ffhgH;figA;fkgAg 1 6 6
8) ffhgH;fi;kgAg 1 6 6
9) ffhgH;figH;fkgAg 8 8 6
10) ffh;igH;fkgAg 7 7 9
With these payos b s is CPE. There is no deviation of any type involving h because it would not be
28protable for h. There is also no unilateral protable deviations by either i or k because these lead to rows
9 or 10. A joint deviation by i and k to SH
i = SH
k = fh;i;kgH is protable but not credible because there
is a further protable deviation by i to SH
i = figH: A joint deviation by i and k to SH
i = SH
k = fi;kgH
is protable but not credible because there is a further protable deviation by i to SH
i = figH: Aj o i n t
deviation by i and k to SH
i = figH and SH
k = fkgH is protable but not credible because there is a further
protable deviation by i and k to SH
i = SH
k = fh;i;kgH:
Proof of Result 3:




i (B): That is, as technology grows payos for farmers in agricultural coalition structures come to Pareto
dominate all other structures (in the tables all entries in rows 4{6 are 1s). Then any strategy prole s which
leads to the coalition structures in rows 4{6 are CPE as there are no protable deviation.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all agents with SH
i
have protable joint deviations (or unilateral deviations if there is only one such agent) to SA
i : The joint
deviation is obviously protable and is credible by all s leading to rows 4, 5, and 6 being CPE.
12 Appendix 2
We now assume that parameters are as in the main text, but that  = 1. Table A2.1 summarizes the results.
Examples of payo tables that were used to construct Table A2.1 are available upon request.
Table A2.1: Equilibrium Strategy Proles,  =1
<1 1 <<2:165 2:165 <<2:399 2:399 <<2:716 >2:716
ffhgH;figH;fkgHg | CPE | | |
ffh;igH;fkgHg | | | | |
fh;i;kgH CPE | | | |
ffhgA;figA;fkgAg | | | | CPE
ffh;igA;fkgAg | | | | CPE
fh;i;kgA | | | | CPE
ffhgH;figA;fkgAg | | | CPE |
ffhgH;fi;kgAg | | | CPE |
ffhgH;figH;fkgAg | | | | |
ffh;igH;fkgAg | | | | |
In earlier times (<1), when both technologies are relatively inecient, the equilibrium coalition
structure is a grand band of foragers. Eventually, knowledge has developed enough (1 <<2:165) for
the grand band of foragers to collapse in favor of singleton bands of foragers. Note that still, no one has
switched to agriculture. Further advances in knowledge (2:165 <<2:399) are associated with a time of
instability. At this level of knowledge, no coalition structure satises the requirements of a CPE. Later,
when knowledge has developed further (2:399 <<2:716), we observe the start of agriculture: agriculture
is adopted by two individuals while an individual remains a forager. Note that farmers may or may not be
members of the same band. Eventually, when knowledge continues to improve (>2:716), everyone has
turned to agriculture.







Figure 1: Equilibrium Foraging Stock









Figure 2: Equilibrium Utility
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